

# The Effects of Insecurity on INGO Proliferation

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## Abstract

A great deal of scholarly work has described and sought to account for disparities in INGO expansion across countries. This paper examines a new set of determinants associated with conflict and political unrest. Framing the disparities in INGO presence in relation to the tension between institutional and realist explanations, I use a time-series analysis of INGO presence between 1979-2006 in a global sample of 164 countries. The findings highlight the interplay between institutional and realist approaches, showing how conflicts can both attract or repel INGOs in accordance to the type of conflict—interstate or instate— intensity, and most importantly the location relative to the capital city.

The exponential growth of the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector over the last thirty years has been documented extensively.<sup>1</sup> Yet it is increasingly clear that this proliferation—and the types of services NGOs offer—varies considerably both across and within countries.<sup>2</sup> This paper is focused on one possible reason for these disparities: the role of conflict and political unrest. Its empirical focus is on international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).

This is an important question for both theoretical and policy-related reasons. First, looking at the effects of conflict on INGOs proliferation spotlights a major theoretical tension—summarized below—between neo-institutionalist and realist explanations for NGOs expansion. Second, it allows us to more fully describe the determinants of INGOs program placement, both an end in itself and one that affects the evaluation of program effects in general.<sup>3</sup>

The scholarly literature on the INGO sector's expansion into war zones has, thus far, been mostly preoccupied with the nature of their activities,<sup>4</sup> the consequences of their activities,<sup>5</sup> and the challenges that aid workers face.<sup>6</sup> With the exception of the recent paper by Murdie and Webeck,<sup>7</sup> the relationship between conflict or political unrest and the spread of the NGO sector has been largely neglected.

This paper adds to Murdie and Webeck's account of the conditions under which conflict impacts the spread of the INGO sector. My general argument is that realist conditions embodied in different type of conflict, and different locations within the boundaries of states, attenuate or

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<sup>1</sup> See Bebbington 2004; Bush 2007; Chhotray 2008; Clark 1995; Clark et al 1998; Fisher 1995; Koo and Ramirez 2009; O'Rourke 2005; Schnable 2015; Vasi 2007

<sup>2</sup> See Smith and Wiest 2005; Dorward 2006; Hearn 1998; Patel and Thara 2003

<sup>3</sup> See Angeles, Guilkey and Mroz 1998; Murdie and Webeck 2015; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986

<sup>4</sup> Jackson 2005; Roberts 2010; Spearin 2011

<sup>5</sup> Abiew 2012; Blumberg 2001; Hafner-Burton et al. 2008; Meernik et al. 2012

<sup>6</sup> Barnes 1998; Fast 2007; Goodhand et al. 2000

<sup>7</sup> Murdie and Webeck. 2015

even reverse the NGO sector's institutional tendency to grow. Specifically, both *instate* conflicts and conflicts concentrated in a country's periphery (rather than core) induce growth in the NGO sector, while *interstate* conflict and conflicts concentrated in or close to a country's core weaken growth in the NGO sector.

The paper is organized as follows. I begin with contextualizing this study in existing scholarship, focusing on the institutional and realist debate on the reasons for the NGO sector's spread, and summarizing Murdie and Webeck's arguments. Next, I present my theoretical model, using a subsample of four countries to illustrate key points underlying my argument. Finally, I introduce the data and methods I use to test my theoretical model: a global sample of INGOs across 164 countries during the period of 1979-2006, merged with data on different types of conflict. Overall, results from a series of Poisson regressions confirm that there are strong effects of conflict on INGO presence, but the effects vary profoundly by type of conflict and location. I conclude with a discussion on the implication of the findings.<sup>8</sup>

### **The Spread of INGOs into Conflict Areas**

Following the Union of International Associations' own standards, I define INGOs as "any organization which is not established by inter-governmental agreement, including organizations which accept members designated by government authorities."<sup>9</sup> This includes organizations like Human Rights Watch, OXFAM, and ICRC.

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<sup>8</sup> Note that I conducted a parallel series of analyses to those described here on a sample of International Government Organizations (IGOs). Growth in this sector across the 30-year period was much more moderate than in the INGO sector. Not surprisingly, analytic results—available from the author—are substantively equivalent but weaker than those dealing with the INGO sector. To maintain a clearer narrative in this paper, I restrict myself to INGOs.

<sup>9</sup> UIA. 2015

Although it is difficult to accurately enumerate NGOs operations in domestic and international arenas, all observers agree that the sector has expanded rapidly.<sup>10</sup> In trying to understand the origins of this expansion, many scholars have adopted a *neo-institutionalist* position. They see NGO expansion as the product of structural factors, especially the emergence of a global civil society, that can be traced back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>11</sup> Others have applied this neo-institutionalist approach to the growth of particular segments of the INGO sector, such as INGOs focusing on poverty, environmental issues, human-rights, and health.<sup>12</sup>

Alongside these neo-institutionalist arguments there is also some recognition that NGOs' actual presence on the ground is influenced by realist concerns, such as security issues, bad infrastructure, or major geopolitical transformations. The most important of these is the extent to which a state intentionally retreats from, or fails to provide, key services,<sup>13</sup> since these provide an opportunity that can be exploited by NGOs.<sup>14</sup> Since wars are among the key factors leading to this type of state retreat<sup>15</sup>—alongside decolonization<sup>16</sup> or major constitutional change<sup>17</sup>—looking at the impact of different types of conflict or their location on the presence of NGOs is a reasonable way to assess how much realist factors moderate the more general neo-institutionalist effects on the expansion of the NGO sector.

Evidence of the insecurity that has increasingly affected INGO personnel can be seen in casualty figures for NGO workers. Figure 1 presents data from the Aid Worker Security Database

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<sup>10</sup> see Galway et al 2012; McCleary 2009; Turner 2010; West 2001; UIA 2007/8

<sup>11</sup> Finnemore 1996; Koo and Ramirez 2009; Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal 1992; West 2001; Meyer and Bromley 2013

<sup>12</sup> Crowson et al. 2012; Maohong 2009

<sup>13</sup> Boli and Thomas 1999; Keese and Argudo 2006

<sup>14</sup> McAdam and Scott 2005; Reimann 2006; Tarrow 1998


<sup>15</sup> Boli and Thomas 1999

<sup>16</sup> Kent and Young 2004: 277–279; Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 1989

<sup>17</sup> e.g., the end of the Cold-War see Walker 1991; Berry 1999

(AWSO), the standard source of data on NGOs casualties and security incidents worldwide. It shows that alongside the NGO sector's growth globally—some of which is in conflict areas—the number of security incidents and casualties grew by 350% between 1997 and 2013. Interestingly, after a rapid increase in the decade after 2001, the number of incidents, as well as injured and kidnapped personnel fell by 2013, though the number of personnel killed remained relatively stable.

**Figure 1: Global View of Aid Workers Security 1997-2013**



Source: Adapted from The Aid Worker Security Database. <https://aidworkersecurity.org/>

Although these casualty estimates are negligible relative to the aid population as a whole, they are significant. The international aid community has little tolerance for casualties. This is particularly true for INGOs, which rely more on international staff in comparison to local NGOs. As a result, security issues can easily disturb or jeopardize an INGO's mission in volatile security environments. The moment an INGO cannot guarantee some measure of security required for their workers they often decide to evacuate staff, at least their non-local staff.<sup>18</sup> Here

<sup>18</sup> Fast 2014; Murdie and Weback 2015

is a clear example of how realities associated with operational context can affect the presence of an INGO, in spite of a need for these organizations' services and broad political support for their actions.

As mentioned, with the exception of Murdie and Webeck,<sup>19</sup> whose analyses show that human security INGOs are less likely to be involved in states with intense ongoing conflict, academic scholarship has not given much attention to the factors that allow the spread of INGOs in conflict areas. Yet Murdie and Webeck's analyses have limitations. In particular, their central focus is on the intensity of conflict—the indicator is an ordinal measure of number of deaths per year—meaning that they ignore differences between instate or interstate conflict, and differences between the location of conflict within states. It is at the core, close to the capital city and hub of political power, or is on the periphery? For example, an interstate conflict, such as the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 that involves a conventional invasion, is a minor conflict in the Murdie and Webeck model, since it was associated with less than 1,000 death per year. But it may have had greater impact on INGO intervention more than the much deadlier instate conflict in Darfur, Sudan. A priori, it seems as important to distinguish types and location of conflict as much as the number of casualties.

Taking types of conflict into account is also important because it taps into the major changes in warfare over the last few decades, changes that have coincided with the rise of NGOs. That is, conventional warfare during most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century involved large armies employing massive firepower from clear frontlines, and was absolutely inhospitable to non-combatants, including NGOs. Toward the end of the Cold-War, however, and continuing in its aftermath, there was a

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<sup>19</sup> Murdie and Webeck 2015

shift toward “post-Clausewitz war”<sup>20</sup>, sometimes referred to as “New Wars”<sup>21</sup>. These are characterized by protracted conflict, sporadic violence, wide use of low-tech weaponry, disappearance of frontlines, and lower intensity.<sup>22</sup> Alongside this movement from predominantly interstate wars to instate conflicts, there has been a decline in the ability of warring states to control their own territory during the conflict. This links to the realist argument of the retreat of the state. At the same time these conditions have given NGOs easier access to the places the state has retreated from, it comes with a price, particularly in conflict areas: the potential for increased insecurity.

In summary, examining the NGO sector’s growth, I expect to see a weakening of INGO expansion, or even a reversal, when realist conditions in the field—especially those associated with a state’s retreat—challenges the presence of the INGOs. More specifically, when interstate rather instate conflict takes place, or when a conflict rages in the capital city and its immediate surroundings rather at the periphery it will damage the INGO expansion trend. Conversely, with instate conflict or with conflict concentrated at the periphery, I would expect a continuation of INGOs institutional expansion.

### **Qualitative comparisons**

More specific ideas about how conflict affects INGO presence can be gleaned by comparing INGO growth trends in a small subsample of conflict areas. Here, I focus on Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan, purposively selected from the 164 country sample to reflect variation in the length and intensity of conflict in the period 1979-2006.

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<sup>20</sup> Holsti and Holsti 1996; Van Creveld 1991

<sup>21</sup> Kaldor 2013


<sup>22</sup> Though scholars are in agreement on the fact that warfare has changed the exact characteristics are debatable. This paper adopts Kaldor’s (2013) approach.

*INGO growth in Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan*

Two trends in INGO growth across the 1960-2003 period are shown in Figure 2.

The first trend confirms the general institutional growth of INGOs, even in conflict areas. The Sudanese and Somali cases exemplify settings with prolonged and intensive conflict: Sudan with several conflicts, including two civil wars (1955-1972 and 1982-2005) and various instate conflicts that continue today, and Somalia with conflicts raging since 1977 up until today. In Sudan, the number of INGOs increased from 60 in 1960 to 287 in 1982 and 433 by 2003. In Somalia we can see the same trend. From 4 in 1960 to 46 in 1977 and 114 by 2003. This positive growth trend is more pronounced in the case of Mali, where the burst of conflict rose from 2 in 1960 to 325 in 2003. The graph exemplifies the continuation of the INGO sector growth in each setting for at least a decade after the beginning of the conflict. Furthermore, in spite of the decline in both cases in the post-Cold War decade the general trajectory since the 70s is still positive.

**Figure 2: Comparative look at the INGO membership combine count per country per year trend in Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan from 1960-2003.**



\*Data are taken from the UIA yearbook series.

The second trend points to a local freeze in the INGO growth or in some cases a decline. This is consistent with the insecurity-driven hypothesis described in this paper. In Sudan, the institution of Sharia penalties in 1991 (following an Islamist coup in 1989) and the intensification of the war against the south in 1992 worsened conditions in the country to the level that impacted the presence of members of the NGO sector. This is illustrated in Figure 2 in the relative stagnation in the NGO sector from 1992 to 2000 and then a decline from 505 in 1998 to 473 in 2000. In Somalia, likewise, the decline in INGOs memberships presence begins not with the outbreak of war in the 1977, but with the 1991 overthrow of the Barre government. The subsequent instability quickly deteriorated into a chaotic battleground among warring parties, tribes and local warlords. The inability to sustain order and to provide security, exacerbated by the U.S intervention in 1993,<sup>23</sup> was reflected in the 25% decline in INGOs and IGOs participation in the country between 1991 and 2003.

### *Spatial patterns*


A different perspective on the relationship between INGO presence and conflict can be seen by looking at variation in the geographic spread of conflict, presented in Figure 3. This also allows us to explain the difference between INGO trends in Sierra Leone and Mali, as seen in Figure 2. Specifically, using Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED)—described below in the Data and Methods section—I map all violent incidents that occurred in the 2001-2006 period in same the four country subsample: Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. Location was operationalized as core or periphery, indexed as 100 mile radius around the capital city. This distance is used in development and health literature for marking the boundaries between core

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<sup>23</sup> Bowden 1999

urban and rural areas.<sup>24</sup> Though in few countries this sphere covers most or even the entire country, like Israel or Rwanda, I believe that it only highlights the complexity of these countries where conflict at its borders can resonate through the entire country.<sup>25</sup> The focus on capital city is due to the fact that in most cases it is the richest city and the one with better infrastructure. Furthermore, the desirability or need to deal with government officials makes turn the capital city more attractive to INGO leaders.

**Figure 3: The distribution of conflict within countries in Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan, 2001-2006.**



Source: Adopted maps based on the ACLED dataset. The circle represents 100 mile radius around the capital city. Maps were created in Tableau.

<sup>24</sup> Forrest and Henshaw 1993; Malay 2002

<sup>25</sup> Stecklov and Goldstein 2004

We see that in Sierra Leone and Somalia the conflict is concentrated at the core (within a 100 mile radius of the capital city). This correlates with the debilitating effects of the Somali and the Sierra-Leonean civil wars on INGOs presence. In contrast, in Sudan and most especially Mali, the conflicts have been concentrated at the periphery, making it easier for aid organizations to operate from the core.

## **Summary**

Although the rapid growth of the INGO sector has been widely discussed in the scholarly literature, and it is known that conflict tends to depress the presence of security-related INGOs, there a number of outstanding empirical questions. Here, I focus on two of them. The overarching one is whether conflicts augment or depress the presence of INGOs in general, not just security-related INGOs. The more specific questions take advantage of variability in the intensity of conflict and its spatial concentration. In particular, how intense must a conflict be, or how close to a country's core must it come, to have an effect on INGO presence, or to reduce—or even augment—the effects of institutionalist forces that have encouraged the rapid proliferation of INGOs over the last 40 years?

## **Data and Variables**

Analysis is conducted in two stages. I begin by examining the effects of conflict on the number of INGOs across a global sample of 164 countries during the years 1977-2006. I then estimate the marginal effects of different types of conflict on the presence of INGOs. To conduct this analysis, I merged a number of datasets.

### *INGO variables*

The key dependent variables in my analyses are single year INGO annual membership count in the Union of International Associations (UIA). This is a commonly used measure of INGO's presence.<sup>26</sup> In this paper, these data are organized in a country year/organization case format and cover the years 1977, 1982-1984, and 1986-2006. Taking into account the availability of key explanatory and control variables, the effective sample size stands at 2258 cases in 191 countries, 164 of which experienced conflict at some point during the 30-year period.

**Table 1: INGOs memberships by decade and existence of conflict**

	All Cases (191 countries)		Conflict (164 countries)	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
80s	623.5	581.7	523.7	461.1
90s	1106.9	889.6	818.1	623.5
00s	1015.5	956.3	797.3	725.5

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these two dependent variables across the general sample and the conflict sub-sample. It confirms the scale of institutional spread for INGOs over the three decade period. There is a sharp increase in the number of INGOs up to the turn of the century, then a slight decline. Furthermore, the differences among countries grows steadily for INGOs, especially in Conflict countries, as seen in the relative size of the mean and standard deviation.

### *Conflict variables*

A number of variables are used to capture different aspects of conflict. Within each model, their effect on the presence of INGOs is lagged by a single year.

<sup>26</sup> Boli and Thomas 1997; Frank et al. 2000; Hughes 2009; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Murdie and Davis 2010; Murdie and Webeck 2015; Paxton 2002

Conflict type is indexed by two dichotomous variables. The first, using UCDP/PRIO data,<sup>27</sup> identifies a conflict as “interstate,” and the second as “instate”. In each case, “1” indexes conflict, and “0” the absence of conflict. Differentiating these two types is important because they have quite different implications for expected participants in the conflict, resources, and technology available to the combatants, and ability to inflict damage.<sup>28</sup> Briefly, interstate conflict is usually associated with conventional warfare. It involves the mobilization of vast state resources and correlates with intense and lethal fighting. Hence it is characterized with enhanced state presence and, as a result, the higher ability of the state to control the field and to allow or prohibit INGOs entry. Conversely, instate war is typically characterized by the retreat of the state and consequently a lower ability of the state to control the field and to allow or prohibit INGOs entry. Those often refer to as “New Wars”.

An additional indicator of insecurity is riots. Drawing from the Aid Worker Security database, which consider riots as a significant security concern, I use riots as a proxy for insecurity in a non-conflict setting. Data on riots were adapted from the Arthur Banks Cross National Time-Series Dataset (CNST) and are also specified dichotomously for any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

A fourth characteristic is conflict intensity, indexed by the number of casualties per year per country. Over and above the type of war—interstate or instate—this provides a more direct measure of the impact of a given conflict. Here, too, I use data from the UCDP/PRIO database. Because of sample size constraints, enormous variation in the number of casualties across conflicts, and uncertainty in the reported number of casualties in any given conflict, I specify this

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<sup>27</sup> Eck 2012; Raleigh et al 2010

<sup>28</sup> Collier and Sambanis 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kaldor 2013

variable dichotomously, follows Jones et al. and Themner and Wallensteen.<sup>29</sup> A “major” conflict is where the number of deaths exceeds 1000 per year (of conflict). A “minor” conflict is where the number of deaths is less than 1000 per year.

The last conflict-related indicator refers to the conflict’s location. It measures if a conflict that occurred between 2001-2006 was concentrated in a given country’s core (in the capital city or within a radius of 100 miles around it) or in its periphery (beyond this 100 miles radius). The data were geolocated using Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) as a first data source. Where these were missing in the ACLED I drew on UCDP GED or, as a last resort, on the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWITI).<sup>30,31</sup>

### *Control variables*

An array of control variables is used to account for other factors that may have affected the growth of the INGO sector. Like the conflict variables, some of these are specified to allow for a one-year lag.

Most of these variables are taken from the Pippa Norris Democracy Time Series database. This contains data on the social, economic and political characteristics of 164 nations with over 600 variables from 1971 to 2007. It merges the data of democracy by Freedom House, Vanhanen, Polity IV, and Cheibub and Gandhi, plus selected institutional classifications and also socioeconomic data from the World Bank.

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<sup>29</sup> Jones et al. 1996; Themner and Wallensteen 2011

<sup>30</sup> Bogen and Jones 2005

<sup>31</sup> While the ACLED and UCDP GED datasets present a wider range of Geo-reference political violence in a country-year case, the RDWITI data focus on terrorism and are organized in a city level location. The logic of using three datasets rather than one is to overcome their limited coverage of global conflicts. To avoid overlapping among the data sets I treated them in a hierarchical way, designating ACLED first, UCDP GED second and RDWITI third.

Political situations and historical legacies provide an alternative explanatory argument for the NGOs' ability to operate in a country.<sup>32</sup> Four variables are used to control for these effects. The first indexes the "Post-Cold War period" (0= up to the end of 1991, 1= 1992 and beyond) to account for changes that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among the most important of these was the state's retreat as the collapse of the Soviet Union and intentionally weakening grip of the other over global international affairs. This opened the door for INGO expansion. The second variable controls for "type of political system." Here, I use a CNST supplement to the Pippa Norris database that examines the military component in a political system with four categories: Civilian, Military-Civilian, Military, and others. I expect a strong military component to be less tolerant of INGOS.<sup>33</sup> The third variable is "freedom of speech" (0=no freedom, 1=limitation on freedom, 2=full freedom added from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project database (CIRI). The fourth variable dichotomously identifies Cold War affiliation (0=Western or non-aligned, 1=ex-Soviet). It accounts for the political heritage of the Cold-War, which generated a post-Soviet political system and norms that were unfriendly to the idea of civil society<sup>34</sup> and also blocked the entrance of the INGO sector into the Soviet sphere of influence for the most of the Cold-War.<sup>35</sup> Finally, I also added a control for an initial count of combined INGOs and International Government Organizations (IGOs) memberships (e.g., EU, IMF, UN branches) in 1960.

Other controls address levels of socioeconomic development, geography and religion, each of which can play an important role in the actual presence, practices, and operation of INGOs in the

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<sup>32</sup> Spires 2011

<sup>33</sup> Cavatorta 2012

<sup>34</sup> Howard 2003

<sup>35</sup> West 2001

field.<sup>36</sup> Development-related variables include a GDP standard indicator of economic growth,<sup>37</sup> the percentage of Internet users (1990-2004) taken from the World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database (ITU) and the gross education enrollment rate (UNESCO).

Broad spatial elements and demographic characteristics include population density per year/country and four regional dummy variables (used to control for possible regional differences in the likelihood of placing or maintaining INGOs): Africa, Asia, Middle East, and South America, leaving North America and Western Europe as the reference category.

Religious context is controlled by identifying the major religious element in a country (dummy variables for predominantly Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox nations with Protestants as the reference category). These data are from Pippa Norris 2009 Democracy Time-series Dataset.

Descriptive statistics for all independent variables and control variables are shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: Descriptive statistics for conflict related and control variables**

<b>Categories</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Instate Conflict	0.15	0.36
Interstate Conflict	0	0.07
Riot	0.13	0.34
Major Conflict	0.05	0.23
Minor Conflict	0.12	0.32
Post-Cold War	0.57	0.49
Core	0.4	0.21

<sup>36</sup> Singh and Lumsden 1990; Woodberry 2012

<sup>37</sup> McCulla and Smith 2007

Periphery	0.17	0.37
Control for the initial count of NGOs in 1960*	202.22	249.79
Military Rule	1.13	0.42
Freedom of Speech	1.1	0.73
Gross education enrollment rate (%), secondary (UNESCO)	60.66	34.73
% of Internet users	2.78	8.12
GDP UN/1000	5743.14	8583.4
Former Soviet Country*	0.11	0.31
Population Density/1000	3120.83	10828.5
Africa*	0.26	0.43
Asia*	0.16	0.36
Middle East*	0.1	0.3
South America*	0.17	0.37
Muslim*	0.24	0.42
Catholic*	0.32	0.46
Orthodox*	0.05	0.23

\*= not lagged

## Analysis

The main analyses are estimated in a series of four Poisson time series regression models with a random effect.<sup>38</sup> Each examines the effect of conflict on the number of INGOs memberships at the sequential year in the period of 1977-2006 using the 164 country sample. The baseline model examines the INGO sector's institutional expansion in settings with three types of insecurity: instate conflict, interstate conflict, and riots. Here the reference group is Western and Protestant countries who have no conflict. The second model adds the dimension of conflict intensity. The third model introduces an identifier for the Post-Cold War era. As described above, this period is associated with the retreat of the state, a central idea in the realist approaches to NGO growth.

<sup>38</sup> The Poisson model is preferred over an OLS model because it better accounts for overdispersion in the dependent variable.

Note, too, that the reference group in these models is now Western and Protestant countries that have no conflict during the period of the Cold-War. Also, the exclusion of Cold-War conflict impact the sample size, lowering it to 153. The final model introduces the indicator of a conflict’s spatial characteristics, that is, whether violence was concentrated in a country’s core or periphery.

A follow-up analysis then specifies a series of interaction terms between these dimensions: type of conflict; conflict intensity; and location of conflict. These allow for a somewhat more realistic identification of effects across combinations of conflict characteristics. All other characteristics of the model—Poisson time series and control variables—remain the same.

*INGO growth in a global sample*

Results of the initial four-model series, net of controls, are presented in Table 3 as incidence rate ratios. Model 1 shows mixed results. For instate conflict the rate ratio for the number of INGO membership is expected to increase in the subsequent year by a factor of 1.03. Instate conflict therefore moderately increases INGOs organizational spread into the country. In contrast, both interstate conflict and riots decrease the organizational spread of INGOs. For interstate conflict the number of INGO membership is expected to decrease in the subsequent year by a factor of 0.68, and for riots by a factor of 0.96. These are net effects.

**Table 3: The effects of different types of conflict on the number of INGOs and IGOs memberships in the subsequent year in a given country, net of controls. Results are presented as incidence rate ratio.**

Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
INGO	INGO	INGO	INGO

	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$
<i>Reference Group: No Conflict, Western Protestant Countries</i>				
Instate Conflict	1.03***	1.09***	1.10***	1.10***
Interstate Conflict	0.68***	0.72***	0.82***	0.82***
Riot	0.96***	0.96***	0.97***	0.97***
Major Conflict		0.95***	0.94***	0.94***
Minor Conflict		0.94***	0.91***	0.91***
Post-Cold War Core			1.38***	1.38***
Periphery				0.67*
Constant	5.45	5.45	5.99	6.04
Wald Chi <sup>2</sup>	57435.46	57463.56	77768.52	77801.56
N Conflict	2258	2258	2205	2205
N Country with conflict	164	164	153	153

Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, p<0.1+

Model controls included: Initial number of INGOs and IGOs combined in 1960, Type of Civilian or Military Regime, Freedom of Speech, Gross education enrollment rate (%), secondary (UNESCO), Percent of Internet users 1990-2004, UN GDP, Population density, Soviet colony, Africa, Middle East, Asia, South America, Predominate Muslim nation, Predominate Catholic nation, Predominate Orthodox nation.

The second model modifies the results, relative to the baseline model. The positive coefficient on instate conflict becomes larger (1.09), the negative coefficient on interstate conflict moves a little closer to the zero (0.72), and the effects of riots is unchanged (0.96). All remain highly significant at the p<.001 level.

Model 2 also shows that both major and minor conflict have negative impacts on organizational spread. INGO memberships decrease by a factor of .95 respectively for major conflict and by

0.94 respectively for minor conflict. These findings are not fully consistent with those reported by Muride and Webeack, since they suggest that the level of intensity does not matter. Both minor and major conflicts have similar effects on INGO presence.

Model 3 adds the control for the post Cold-War period. As expected, there is a strong positive effect on INGO membership—the incidence rate ratio is 1.38. There is also a positive and significant effect on IGO membership (incidence rate ratio of 1.03). Equally interesting, the addition of the post Cold War measure has virtually no effect on those associated with instate conflict, riots, or conflict intensity. It does, however, attenuate the effects of interstate conflict, which may be picking up a simple temporal effect—the secular rise in the number of INGOs—or it may suggest that INGO presence was particularly reduced in conflict zones during the Cold War.


The fourth model introduces the dimension of a conflict's location—at the core or periphery of a state. Results show clear and powerful effects. Net of all other variables in the model, a conflict concentrated within a radius of 100 miles of the capital city reduces the number of INGOs by a factor of 0.67 in the subsequent year. Where a conflict is concentrated *beyond* the radius of 100 miles from the capital city, the results are inverted: INGO membership increases by a factor of 1.29. Equally important, the addition of these conflict-location factors changes none of the other estimated effects associated with type of conflict, conflict intensity and period. They remain unchanged in terms of effect size and level of statistical significance.

#### *Interaction effects*

To identify the effects of conflict on INGO presence across different combinations of conflict characteristics, I ran an additional series of regressions with interactions between type of

conflict, conflict intensity, and location of conflict. The results of the best-fitting model are presented in Appendix I. For ease of interpretation, Figure 4 presents the predicted marginal values of INGOs<sup>39</sup> for four combinations of intensity and location (Major\*Core/ Major\*Periphery/ Minor\*Core/ Minor\*Periphery) for both instate and interstate conflicts. In the left-hand column are two examples of each type.

**Figure 4: Predicted number of INGOs by conflict characteristics, net of controls in Table 3**



<sup>39</sup> The results for IGOs, presented in Appendix I, though different in the size of margins are parallel in trends to the INGO ones.

The results underscore the importance of looking at combinations of characteristics, in particular combinations involving location. Net of type and intensity of conflict, and the array of other control variables, conflict areas only attract more INGOs than no-conflict and no-riots areas (6.37) where the conflict's location is concentrated on the periphery of a state. In fact, the location of a conflict (Core or Periphery) is the most significant predictor of INGO expansion in areas of conflict. In states with no conflict and no riots, we see an increase of 6.36 INGOs. In conflicts on the periphery, of the type described in Mali or Sudan in Figure 3, we see an increase of 6.72 INGOs for any type of conflict, 6.48 for Major Interstate Conflict, 6.85 for Major Instate Conflict, 6.42 for Minor Interstate Conflict, and 6.8 for Minor Instate Conflict. Conversely, conflicts at the core, such as those in Sierra Leone and Somalia, reduces the predicted number of INGOs to 5.88 for any type of conflict, 5.92 for Major Interstate Conflict, 6.3 for Major Instate Conflict, 5.81 for Minor Interstate Conflict, and 6.18 for Minor Instate Conflict. In fact, in terms of strength of effects on INGO membership, only instate vs. interstate variation in the number of INGOs comes close to Core vs. Periphery.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

Overall, the analyses reported in Table 3 and Figure 4 points to some important constraints on the INGO organizational expansion story. Specifically, the ascendance of INGOs has been most notable in places with instate conflict, irrespective of the casualty figures. In contrast, interstate conflict and riots in general depress the number of INGOs. This difference in the effect of inter- and instate conflict turns our attention back to the “New Wars”, the type of wars that are frequent in the Post-Cold War period, since as noted above, these tend to be instate conflicts with some

degree of spatial fragmentation.<sup>40</sup> That is, they lack distinct fronts between combatant groups, and have sporadic and fragmented patterns of violence that are more prevalent on the periphery than at the center of a country. More specifically, the positive coefficient on instate conflict in Table 3 raises the possibility that the apparent hospitability of instate conflict for INGOs and IGOs is related to instate conflict's fragmentation. That fragmentation allows the INGO sector to enter and operate more easily in instate conflict zones. This positive effect remains even when we control for location of conflict within the country.

Results in model 4 in Table 3 confirm this hypothesis. They show that where a conflict rages in or close to the capital city, INGO presence falls. Conversely, a conflict concentrated mostly at the periphery attracts more INGOs. These trends suggest that access to the core and its resources are important for the INGO sector. The inability to access those resources damages institutional expansion.

These results also inform debates between realist and neo-institutionalist takes on NGO spread. Three characteristics of conflicts that facilitate organizational spread—instate conflict occurring in the Post-Cold War, and concentrated in the periphery—index a state in retreat: in instate conflict the state retreat is in accordance with the Kaldor's spatial fragmentation explanation; a related point, conflict on the periphery illustrates the relative inability of the state to project power throughout its territory; and in the Post-Cold War period the superpowers retreated from their restrictive foreign policy. Together, by pointing to the limits of organizational spread, these results support a more realist explanation for INGO proliferation, or at least a constraint on the neo-institutionalist story.

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<sup>40</sup> Kaldor 2013

Overall, therefore, the INGO sector's institutional expansion in conflict areas displays a mixed trend. On one hand, the data reveal a substantial increase in the presence of the INGO sector in conflict areas (i.e. Instate conflict, Post-Cold War conflict, and conflict at the periphery), highlighting the power of institutional explanations. However, this trend of expansion is constrained by insecurity in the field. This paradox, where conflict both induces and represses organizational spread can be explained in the tension between institutionalism and realism. While institutional spread constantly stimulates expansion of the NGO sector, it is structurally restricted by security threats. The question is, what types of security threats or characteristics of conflict are powerful enough to moderate or reverse the power of the institutional force. This analysis suggests that the most important characteristics are not the intensity of conflict—that is, the casualty levels—but whether a conflict is occurring at country's core, and whether it is an interstate conflict.

The relations between institutionalism and realism are not unavoidably contradictory. The model of expansion that emerges from these analyses allocates complementary roles to each one. Therefore, we can argue that neo-institutional theory highlights the impetus of organizations while realism signals the paths it can or cannot launch into.

The paper also highlights the importance of factors that restrict the pattern of organizational spread, which modifies Meyer and Bromley's<sup>41</sup> neo-institutional account. Analyses here suggest that among these factors are particular types of conflict. They can halt or even reverse the spread of INGOs even while a state's retreat opens the door to INGO-related services. Though conflict areas represent extreme—though not too uncommon—field conditions, the strength of the effects observed here raise questions about other conditions that might reduce the appeal of given

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<sup>41</sup> Meyer and Bromley 2013

national context. These could include high crime rate, harsh trade barriers or absence of tax benefits for INGOs, or unstable geopolitical conditions.

The results of this study also contribute to the emerging discussion linking global civil society in areas of conflict. It identifies a causal line between transformation in warfare and the expansion of the global civil society. While the New Wars' dominant discourse identifies instate conflict as being more lethal than interstate<sup>42</sup> this paper shows that despite that difference, instate conflict zones are more hospitable for INGOs. This is likely related to the random, limited, and sporadic nature of warfare in New Wars, and to the combatants' inability to exert full control over the conflict area, all of which allows more room for external actors, such as INGOs, to step in. For example, the early conventional phase of the Iraqi War severely limited the INGO sector's freedom. They were compelled to secure the combatants' permission in order to establish any operations. In contrast, during the insurgency phase that followed, the INGO sector's dependency in the combatants' will and permission diminished along with the actual ability of the combatant to control the arena. So, paradoxically, instate conflict areas, though associated with their high casualty rates, have provided more fertile ground for the INGO sector's expansion.

Finally, INGOs' growing presence in general, and presence in conflict areas in particular, is not only the story of the aid and development sector or institutional expansion, but rather a part of a more comprehensive trend of globalization. How are other dimensions of globalization such as democratization, ecological transformation, or the emergence of international markets affected by different types of conflict? Likewise, as new types of war and conflict emerge alongside continued institutional pressures for INGO sector expansion, it will be interesting to see how the

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<sup>42</sup> Kaldor 2013

INGO sector responds. What sort of relationship will they develop with military authorities or other combatant groups? And how, if at all, will military decisions—tactical or strategic—change in order to take into account actual or anticipated INGO presence? I leave it to future research to examine these and related factors, all of which may moderate INGO's presence and effects in areas of military conflict.

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
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**Appendix I: Predicted number of IGOs by conflict characteristics, net of controls in Table 3**



Events include interactions between the conflict's intensity and its location (Major and Center, Major and Periphery, Minor and Center, Minor and Periphery). \*Does not include interactions

Periphery  Interstate and Periphery   
 Neutral or Center  Interstate and Center

**Appendix II: Full table of the effects of different types of conflict on the number of INGOs and INGOs memberships in the subsequent year in a given country, net of controls. Results are presented as incidence rate ratio.**

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
	INGO	INGO	INGO	INGO
	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$
<i>Reference Group: No Conflict, Western Protestant Countries</i>				
Instate Conflict	1.03***	1.09***	1.10***	1.10***
Interstate Conflict	0.68***	0.72***	0.82***	0.82***
Riot	0.96***	0.96***	0.97***	0.97***
Major Conflict		0.95***	0.94***	0.94***
Minor Conflict		0.94***	0.91***	0.91***
Post-Cold War			1.38***	1.38***
Core				0.67*
Periphery				1.29*
INGO # 1960	1***	1***	1***	1***
Military Rule	0.88***	0.88***	0.97***	0.97***
Speech	1.04**	1***	1.01***	1.01***
Second Education UN	1***	1***	1***	1***
Internet	1***	1***	1***	1***
GDP UN	1***	1***	1***	1***
Former Soviet	1.31	1.31	0.88	0.87
Population Density	1***	1***	1***	1***
Africa	1.13	1.14	0.62*	0.58**
Asia	1.09	1.09	0.8	0.74
Middle East	1.17	1.18	0.84	0.92

South America	0.95	0.95	0.63*	0.64*
Muslim	0.82	0.82	0.74*	0.66**
Catholic	1.18	1.18	1.19	1.11
Orthodox	1.14	1.14	1.01	0.92
Constant	234.34	234.95	402.76	422.45
Wald Chi <sup>2</sup>	57435.46	57463.56	77768.52	77801.56
N Conflict	2258	2258	2205	2205
N Country	164	164	153	153

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Note: \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, p<0.1+