Too Much Pressure: The intended and unintended consequences of sousveillance

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Abstract

Sousveillance, a surveillance from below on the government, has been acknowledged as an empowering civil society act that puts the government at check. With its increasing popularity in academic and popular circles came a need to better understand its implications, its intended and unintended consequences. It remains unclear if sousveillance is just another form of protest or like surveillance can incite compliance and panopticism. This question is important since unlike surveillance, where the powerful observe the weak, in sousveillance the power hierarchy is inverted. Using data from interviews, peace organizations reports, and open sources, I examine peace movements sousveillance on checkpoint missions in the West Bank, exploring the association between level of social pressure applied via sousveillance and the result of compliance or resistance. I argue that sousveillance can be panoptic and lead to compliance, and in this case improve human rights in the checkpoints. However, this is true only when the subjects observed feel they are not pressed too much. Too much pressure, in the form of aggressive or invasive sousveillance can easily trigger resistance and in some cases backfire, becoming counterproductive.

In the last decade multiple studies and articles celebrated sousveillance—a surveillance from below on the government—as a trend empowering society and putting governments at check (Birch 2005; Bock 2016; Brucato 2015; Ganascia 2010; Hoffman 2006; Mann 2005; Vertegaal and Shell 2008). However, it remains unclear what the actual effect of this form of civil engagement is. Namely, if sousveillance can bring a change in behavior and more importantly, if it can incite compliance by the objects watched, given the observed are those who hold positions of power. This question is not unique to sousveillance but in fact addresses a core dilemma in the study of surveillance in general and the impact of panopticism. On many occasion surveillance fails to discipline the subject, and instead generate a host of unintended consequences where people refuse to comply with the gaze (Bennett 2010; Langman 2008; Marx 2003; McColgan 2005; Rhodes 1998). Most notable is resistance to surveillance that in some cases can even lead to an opposite outcome. When looking at sousveillance, as a form of civic engagement aimed at bettering society, understanding when sousveillance's social pressure disciplines the objects of the gaze and when it provokes them to resist is crucial.

In this spirit, this study explores the link between levels of social pressure applied via sousveillance and the result of compliance or resistance. I examine security forces' responses to civil organization and peace movements' sousveillance in checkpoint missions. Particularly, I focus on the intended and unintended consequences of sousveillance in this context, illustrating when it forces compliance and when it backfires. I argue that sousveillance can be panoptic, leading to compliance. However, this is true only when the powerful observed and pressed feel they are not pressed too much. Too much pressure, in the form of aggressive or invasive sousveillance can easily trigger resistance and in some cases can backfire and become counterproductive. To examine my argument, I use data representing both the surveillants

(activists) and the subjects (soldiers) from three sources: 1) interviews with 33 Israeli soldiers with checkpoints mission experience 2) over 12,000 daily reports of peace organization 3) open sources.

Thus, far studies on sousveillance focused mainly on cases where it's been used to police the police (Bayerl and Stoynov 2016; Bock 2016; Brucato 2015) not paying much attention to soldiers as objects of observation. Soldiers are important group to study in the context of sousveillance and policing since across the globe they are de-facto and de-jure the local police, responsible for law and order (Easton et al. 2010; Kraska 2007; López-Montiel 2000). Moreover, in the last decade the military and the police grew closer with the militarization of the police (Balko 2013) and the policing missions of soldiers across the globe (Hills 2001). Beyond these aspects, there are numerous parallels between the police and military, especially if we focus on checkpoint or border control missions that can be handled by both. By looking at Israeli soldiers at the West Bank checkpoints and their responses to sousveillance I shed some light on this understudied population and its dynamics.

Determining when sousveillance leads to compliance and when it does not is important for theoretical and practical reasons. It tackles the fundamental question in surveillance studies of why panopticism fails, clarifying the conditions in which a subject of surveillance would decide to resist. Second, the paper highlights the hierarchical element in resistance to sousveillance, where the objects of observation are not helpless and have substantial agency. Finally, the paper offers guidelines for practitioners and activists who use sousveillance in their line of work, highlighting the strengths and limitations of this strategy.

Sousveillance

Inverting the roles of surveillant and subject, sousveillance describes a situation where society looks back at the sovereigns, surveilling them. The term was coined by Mann (2004) defining it as an act of "observing and recording by an entity not in a positon of power or authority over the subject of the viellance.[1]" Mann described the prevalence of technology, particularly handheld or wearable cameras, and the impact of these devices on others. However, as the use in sousveillance increased it encompassed other forms of oversights (Toch 2012). The term was situated in the larger context of civic democratic responsibility, as an act undertaken by those who are generally the subjects of surveillance by the state. This exemplifies in the research of Brucato (2015) or Bock (2016) on police accountability organization, and the study of Bayerl and Stoynov (2016) on the role of digital media in shaming policemen that committed injustices. In these studies, technology empowers people and allows them to oversee the police, uncovering injustices and promoting "naming and shaming" online campaigns.

Though celebrated, the actual outcome of sousveillance was barely addressed in the literature. Focusing on the Stokes Croft violent events in Bristol 2011, Reilly (2015) showed how sousveillance reshaped public discourse on the events. On April 21, 2011 violence broke out after police raids to evict a squat occupied by opponents of new Tesco Metro in the Stokes Croft area. At the end of the evening, eight police officers and several protesters were injured. The police narrative was refuted when footage released to YouTube supported the claims of local residents, accusing the police with heavy handed tactics. In a different study Bakir (2013) examines the Abu Graib case, where nongovernmental organizations' sousveillance coerced the

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[1] "observing" or "watching" in French.

U.S. authorities to accept responsibly on detainees' torture and abuse committed by personnel of the United States Army and the Central Intelligence Agency. In term of its effect, in both studies sousveillance, as described, operated as a popular substitute for investigative journalism (Bock 2016) rather than as a panopticon. Sousveillance's main function was to inform the public on police violence or military personal crimes. In the case of Abu Graib this exposure pressed the administration to assume responsibility as well. Nonetheless, these studies did not demonstrate a self-disciplinary mechanism among those sousveilled.

Surveillance, compliance and resistance

Generally, the question of if sousveillance induces compliance remains unclear. On the other hand, the disciplinary effect of surveillance has been one of the foundations of the study of social control. Introduced by Foucault, the panoptic surveillance describes a type of monitoring that leads to acceptance of regulations and docility. The compliance occurring is self-driven. The subject of surveillance internalizes the goal of the observer and applies self-discipline. The Foucauldian panopticon became a cornerstone in the study of social control, used in multiple cases. Notable examples are: the airport security experience (Browne 2015; Epstein 2007), the beauty and fashion industry (Mears 2008), security measures in school and students' fear (Bachman, Randolph and Brown 2011) and compliance to medical surveillance (Howson 1999).

Despite surveillance success in pressing people to comply, surprisingly, panopticism frequently fails. Boyne (2000) stressed the failure of panopticism in producing reliably docile subjects, mentioning prison riots, asylum sub-cultures, ego survival in Gulag or concentration camps, and re-tribalization in the Balkans as examples. The fact is that subjects do not always comply; many times they prefer to resist. Ashton-Shaeffer et al. (2001) examined how disabled individuals challenge the docile body expectation by taking an active role in physical activities. Gilliom

(2001) described the everyday resistance strategies to social welfare monitoring of poor

Appalachian women in the United States, and Moore and Haggerty (2001) described the rise

of resistance technologies and tactics designed to assist teens and others to 'beat' home drug tests.

McColgan (2005) examined resistance strategies of people with dementia living in a nursing

home as they try to create private spaces within an intrusive culture of surveillance.

Though in some cases resistance can be violent (Rhodes 2004) for the most part resistance is

disruptive and its unintended consequences are negligible in the eye of the surveillant. The

nurses dealing with the dementia patients' resistance in McColgan's study faced nuisance but not

a threat or type of counter-pressure that may convince them to stop surveilling the patients.

Nonetheless, when we examine sousveillance, where the subject is far of being helpless,

resistance has the potential to make sousveillance counter-productive. Mann (2003) identified the

differences between one subject to another, referring to political sousveillance as *hierarchal*

sousveillance.

The intended and unintended consequences of sousveillance

Those who hold positions of power are not unique and are susceptible to the panoptic gaze as

anyone else. The difference is that in situations that include sousveillance usually these

individuals have the ability either to stop sousveillance or make it counterproductive. It means

that it is important to understand under what conditions the powerful decide to resist or not.

Panopticism in the context of police officers' behavior has been addressed by Farrar (2014),

highlighting the link between technological surveillance and policemen's compliance with

regulations. A Chief of Police in Rialto, California himself, Farrar studied body cameras used by

the Rialto police and their impact over police officers in the field. Farrar experimented with the

effect of body-worn video cameras on the policemen's self-awareness and socially desirable behavior. He argued that the cameras increase the police officers' self-consciousness and, consequently their compliance to rules of conduct, especially those concerning use of force. This research's findings showed a substantial reduction in the total number of incidents with police use of force compared to controlled conditions.

Figure 1: A diagram of the flow of pressure in cases of sousveillance involving security forces

Though assuming the Foucauldian internalization of the surveillance Farrar's experiment did not demonstrate it. Nonetheless, I hypothesize that same as surveillance, sousveillance can incite self-discipline by the subject. Sections A and B in figure 1 illustrate this effect. Regularly, the security forces apply pressure over people in this type of interaction (Section A). However, when

sousveillance begins they monitor they behavior and reducing the level of pressure applied

(Section B). Examples for reduction in pressure include a lenient enforcement of regulations and

law, pulling back, and restricting their agency and actions in the situation.

Putting individuals that regularly enjoy a great amount of agency and a powerful status under

surveillance has the potential that they will attempt to stop or make it useless. For example, in

the U.S. the Internal Revenues Service developed profiles used to locate those are to be audited,

in order to create a fair and proportional shared responsibility in terms of tax payments. Thus, the

middle-class and wealthy families as well as businesses turn to tax attorneys to shrink their

profiles to pay less (Gilliom 2001:102). Their resistance countered the purpose of fair tax burden.

Nongovernmental organizations and watchdogs that monitor governments or security forces

regularly challenge the hierarchy between the powerful and the weak. Accordingly, these

organizations and activists can easily become targets themselves of discriminatory legislation or

physical threat.[2]

The point where panopticism fails is unclear. However, in the case of sousveillance, I

hypothesize that failure will occur when the subjects feel they are losing control over the

situation. I hypothesize that when feeling the sousveillance's pressure is too intrusive or

pressing, making them feel they are losing control, the subjects will resist in a way that will try to

stop the sousveillance or make it ineffective. Examples of that sort of pressure include argument,

physical contact, inciting violence, and violating the private space. This dynamic illustrated in

sections C and D in figure 1. The pressure on the security forces members increases, becoming

disruptive (Section C). The pressure can come not only from the surveillants but also from the

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[2] See anti-NGOs legislation and government led campaigns in China, Egypt, Israel, Nigeria, and Russia.

people witnessing the sousveillance and feeling empowered. This level of pressure invites a response—resistance to sousveillance. The security forces try to regain control, pushing back the surveillants and the people (Section D). Examples include the use of violence, arresting individuals, strict enforcement of regulations and law, or collective punishment.

The West Bank checkpoints as points of contention

Since 1967, the West Bank has been under Israeli military rule. What started as a temporary solution grew to become a permanent situation. This unclear and unstable status fell apart in the 80s with the eruption of the First Intifada (Hunter 1993). The beginning of the peace-talks in the 90s alleviated the violence and led to the Oslo Accord and the two states solution. The murder of Rabin, the Israeli prime minister and the major architect of the peace-talks damaged the negotiation's momentum and eventually ended in an impasse and the restitution of violence (Greenberg 2001; Qurie 2008). Incapable of detaching from the West Bank and suffering from insurrections and terror, the Israeli answer was a broad pacification campaign. A cornerstone of this campaign has been wide movement restrictions across the West Bank. This involved several tactics: the erection of the separation wall, the temporary siege of Palestinian cities, and the checkpoints (Harel 2005). Out of these three, the one that produced most interaction between the IDF soldiers and the general Palestinian population in the West Bank was the checkpoint.

The number of checkpoints across the West Bank has been fluctuating in line with the security situation and political agreements between both sides. However, up until recently, the general tendency was of increase. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in 2012 the number of checkpoints across the West Bank stood at 522, an increase from 503 in 2010. These numbers did not include the ad-hoc 'flying' checkpoints

that in 2011 amounted in average to 495 a month (OCHA 2011). The relatively quiet years in the West Bank along with international pressure brought some easing on the freedom of movement issue. In September 2013, the number of checkpoints decreased to 99 permanent checkpoints and to 174 ad-hoc checkpoints. As of 2015, out of 96 existing checkpoints, 39 are the last inspection point before entering Israel, leaving 57 as internal checkpoints throughout the West Bank (B'Tselem 2015).

Close examination of the checkpoint underlines that they differ in size, purpose and the way they function. Some, like Hawara or Qalandiya checkpoints, are in fact international borders, regulating the movement in and outside the Green Line.[3] These types of checkpoints are regularly built as terminals and accommodate the movement of thousands of people per day. Another type of checkpoint is the one policing vital points and crossroads in the West Bank or entry points to Jerusalem or the settlements. These inspection points are the main points of contact with the Palestinian population. Finally, there are the ad-hoc flying checkpoints that are placed in response to security assessments.

As constant sites of friction, the checkpoints have been attracting much critique, domestic and abroad. They became one of the symbols of state repression and as so became the target of civil society protest and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) activity. The checkpoints' wide spread made them impossible to avoid on any journey throughout the West Bank, inciting several civil society organizations to address the issue.

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[3] The Green Line is the demarcation line set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and neighbors after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. It served as the de facto borders of the State of Israel from 1949 until the Six-Day War in 1967. The West Bank is located beyond these lines.

Several human rights and peace organizations operating in the West Bank every so often organized protests or other activities targeted at the checkpoints. Military Court Watch issued reports on harsh treatment of children in checkpoints, Ta'ayush, a Palestinian-Israeli grassroots organization, organized protests several times at checkpoints, Shovrim Shtika (Breaking the Silence) has been recording testimonies of soldiers, describing human rights violations at the checkpoints, and B'Tzelem, a human rights organization, has been issuing annual updates on the Israeli checkpoints. International human rights organizations have been active in the struggle against the checkpoints as well. Christ at the Checkpoint Conference (CATC), based in Bethlehem, is a collation of religious institutions that organized bi-annual conference that critique, among other issues, the Israeli checkpoint policy. In the city of Hebron, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) is a civilian observer mission that among its duties addresses checkpoint violations in the city of Hebron. Finally, other small international anarchist organizations targeted some checkpoints for a period of time as part of their campaigns and agenda.

Nonetheless, in the peace organizations landscape, MachsomWatch has been considered as a prominent and consistent actor on that issue. MachsomWatch is an Israeli all-women peace movement that protests the Israeli checkpoint policy in the West Bank that restricts the Palestinians' freedom of movements (Braverman 2012; Kotef 2011a; Kotef and Amir 2007). The organization focuses its entire agenda around the checkpoints with daily observation missions, organized weekly educational tours in the West Bank, and active participation in the checkpoint routine as problem solvers. The organization sends observation teams that monitor activity at the checkpoint and often engage with the soldiers and local population, trying to solve problems or to address what they interpret as injustice.

Operating a checkpoint is a complicated and demanding task. A small group of soldiers, sometimes only four, needs to maintain crowd control and to inspect vehicles and people crossing manually while navigating a complicated bureaucracy. This should be done in line with regulations and authorizations the local population have (or not) and with local emergencies like a pregnant woman or an ill child that wish to cross. The shifts are between 8 to12 hours long, and often twice a day. In this process the soldiers' principal concern is security. The proximity to the crowd that usually outnumbers the soldiers exposes the soldiers to numerous potential security threats. Between September 2015 until September 2016, twenty-two terrorist attacks took place in West Bank checkpoints. Those included knife attacks against soldiers at the checkpoints and bombs hidden in cars and on people passing through the checkpoints. The soldiers are trying to achieve security by stressing order and discipline in the line and throughout the inspection process. A breach in the order, as the soldiers perceive it, would drive the soldiers to try to regain control and balance.

Data and Methods

The data for this case are drawn from three sources: interviews, reports, and open sources. The first includes 33 interviews with Israeli soldiers who manned checkpoints and mounted patrols in the West Bank during the period of 1996-2016. The mounted patrol mission was included since one of its main tasks was the immediate response to problems at the checkpoints, including pressure from protestors and peace activists. The interviews were carried out in person, by phone, or online. Each interview was conducted in a semi-structured form (Drever 1995), building on eight basic questions, three of them written to establish the respondent's fit to the sample and five more that focused on the interaction from a professional perspective—meaning as professional soldiers. Follow-up questions were raised to clarify a point or to redirect the interview back to the topic.

Finding respondents proved difficult due to the size of the population studied. Only a small segment of those who serve in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) belong to the infantry units responsible for checkpoint missions. Furthermore, only a fraction of those were deployed in the West Bank and even a smaller portion manned checkpoints and patrol missions. Within the sample, for most this mission was temporary for a few months only. Finally, the political atmosphere where this data was collected was very delicate, as soldiers' accounts on the topic of morality in IDF during the Second Gaza War (Breaking the Silence 2015) released to the public received much negative attention in the Israeli media. Therefore, many potential respondents declined participation, fearing being associated with a contested political agenda.

To overcome these barriers and to fit the sampling method to the population, I draw from the literature of hard to reach populations (Atkinson and Flint 2001; Faugier and Sargeant 1997). Using my professional and social network as well as visiting Israel I followed Christopoulos' (Christopoulos 2010) support for snowball sampling method (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981; Goodman 1961) as the proper method for an expert population, I employed this method to identify and create this sample.

The second is MachsomWatch's daily reports, available in their website and covering the period of 2005-2016, containing over 12,000 daily reports. The reports depict MachsomWatch's observation team's account of events and conditions in the checkpoints visited. The number of observation teams and thus the number of checkpoints visited fluctuates in line with the observations team's discretion. Accordingly, some days show multiple reports while other days have none. The reports are unstructured, written in a non-formal way by different writers, often taking a form of a personal diary. For the most part, the reports describe the checkpoints routine,

the interaction between the activists, the checkpoints operators, the local population, and the outcome of these interactions.

To examine the correlation between the activists' intervention and outcome I conducted a quantitative textual analysis on a random sub-sample of events, encompassing MachsomWatch's reports from the first six months of 2010. Drawing from Weintraub (1981) and Skinner (2014), I conducted analysis of verbal behavior, focusing on particular verbs to assess dynamics represented in the text. The variables examined are verbs that are associated with the activist teams' agency: "Called", "Phoned", "Spoke", and "Asked." These verbs represent most of MW's members' attempts to influence events or conditions in the roadblocks. To make sure that the verbs are associated with the teams and not with other actors described in the report, I paired them with the pronouns "We" and "I."

In this sub-sample, I isolate each word combination and examine three elements. First, if the activist attempted to generate a change that is related to the checkpoint's flow in the described event (e.g. opening a new gate in the checkpoint). To make sure that the action verbs address activists' attempts to influence movement in the Checkpoint and not for something else I control for their relevancy (Table 1, column 2). Second, if there was a successful change (e.g. the gate was opened, a new lane was opened, the line moves faster). And finally, with whom the members interacted in the event (i.e. soldiers, Palestinians, or a third party).

Table 1: Events, their relevancy, and correlation with change, 2010

	# of Events	Relevancy	Successful Change	Actor Addressed by MW Members*	
"We Called/I Called"	54	50	23	Soldiers/Security Guards	4

				Palestinians	0
				Third Party	50
"We Phoned/I Phoned"	22	21	14	Soldiers/Security Guards	0
				Palestinians	0
				Third Party	22
"We Asked/I Asked"	34	8	0	Soldiers/Security Guards	7
				Palestinians	18
				Third Party	5
"We Spoke/I Spoke"	95	20	4	Soldiers/Security Guards	29
				Palestinians	50
				Third Party	8

*The column excludes options that are not Soldiers/Palestinians/Third Party.

The third is open sources, looking at news articles from the Israeli and international media, NGOs' publications, media clips and documentaries on the topic, and official government documents. The news articles include articles from the leading Israeli news outlets, such as (Haaretz, Ynet, NRG, Walla, and Nana10). The NGOs' publications include the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), B'tzelem, Blue and White Human Rights (BWHR), MachsomWatch, and Taayosh. Online media clips accounts for material release on by NGOs, in the news, or in documentaries on the topic that capture the interaction between the activists and the soldiers. Official government document includes the Knesset Committee's protocols and the Israeli Defense Forces announcements and letters.

Using these data sources, I triangulate a comprehensive picture of the sousveillance's intended and unintended consequences. I begin with establishing that there is sousveillance on the soldiers at checkpoints and describing its form and intentions, using all three sources. Later, I examine the intended consequences of the sousveillance, focusing on change in behavior and panopticism. For the first I use all three data sources and for panopticism I rely mostly on the soldiers' accounts. Lastly, I look at the soldiers' resistance, how it manifests and what triggers it. Here, again I am illustrating it with the three data sources.

Checkpoint under sousveillance

The liminal state of West Bank, neither an independent state nor an integral part of the state of Israel, increases the checkpoint's controversy, identifying them as security measures or means of oppression. The checkpoints epitomize both the Israelis' and Palestinians' main concern: security and discrimination. As a result, events at the checkpoints attract attention in the traditional and online media and are immediately politicized, placing the soldiers at the eye of the storm, branded as heroes or villains.

As mentioned, peace organizations have regularly protested and monitored the soldiers in their checkpoint routine. Apart from making a broader claim regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in their protest or monitoring the activists try to bring a change in the soldiers' behavior in a way that helps local population. This trend received much attention from the Israeli media, and was quickly politicized, framed as human rights activists helping people in a difficult situation or anti-Zionist anarchists making the work of the soldiers harder than it is (Foyer 2013; Kotef 2011b; Ravid 2013). In this discussion both sides acknowledge the presence of these activists in the checkpoints and their engagement with the soldiers and Palestinians. An examination of

MachsomWatch's reports and open sources shows that the activists frequently engaged with the soldiers, requesting them to open a closed gate, to hurry the checkpoint examination, to allow someone to pass, or to pay attention to people in dire need of medical care. By doing so the activists signal the soldiers that they are watching their actions and are aware of the checkpoint routine.

Excerpt #1: MachsomWatch Report (07.25.2013)

> *"A youngster, whose brother has cancer and is hospitalized in Mokassad Hospital in East Jerusalem, said he and his brother received permits to enter and stay by the patient, but the patient's wife did not get one. We spoke with the officer. The young man was let in and got a permit for the wife. What would have happened if we were not there? Would the wife have been prevented from seeing her husband?"*

Excerpt #1 describes this sort of interaction. The activists converse with the Palestinians, seeing things the soldiers may not see. Later they challenge the soldier with this information, showing them that there are problems they are not aware need to be addressed. This sort of interaction is confirmed in news clips and online media, showing the back and forth of the activists from the Palestinians to the soldiers, as mediators and advocators. The sousveillance is sometimes more preannounced as activists write reports on what they see, take pictures, or request the security forces to self-identify in name and rank.

One of the activists' most effective tools in forcing a change in behavior is their access to supervisory institutions and individuals. The activists learn that soldiers have limited discretion and generally prefer not to decide on many issues, leaving the situation unsolved. The activists' solution was to contact the individuals and organizations that can force a change in behavior. Those included the local military headquarters and civilian organizations that are part of the Israeli Civil Administration—the governing body of the West Bank (*i.e.* District Coordination Liaison Offices, District Coordination Offices, and the Humanitarian Center).

Excerpt #2: MachsomWatch Report: (06.27.2011)

> " .. Qalandiya, 15:50: As we arrived at the checkpoint (CP) we first noted a *Jerusalem ambulance waiting in the southern square.... When we asked the Palestinian driver what was happening, he told us that the soldiers were claiming there was no coordination (but the driver said he had started out only on receiving coordination confirmation). We phoned headquarters and spoke with Karin who was polite and business-like. We gave her the name of the middle-aged woman in the ambulance ... Karin promised to check-up on matters and within 5 minutes the ambulance was instructed over the PA system to proceed into the CP.*"

Excerpt #2 illustrates this dynamic, as the activists notice something they interpret as a problem at the checkpoint—an ambulance that cannot pass. In response, they called the humanitarian headquarters to seek a solution. The humanitarian headquarters confirm the authorization to pass and inform the checkpoint, giving them a green light for the ambulance. This strategy worked and the soldiers allowed the ambulance to continue. Moreover, both MachsomWatch reports and the interviews with the soldiers indicate that this line of communication is used not only for problem solving but also for report on violations. On several occasions the activists filed complaints on soldiers or called the police on them.

The direct line for supervisors is not secretive and has been recognized by the soldiers as one of the activists' sousveillance tools. The activists enjoy an open line with people in those institutions, asking for or providing information and pressing their agenda. Some of these organizations and activists are associated with government and Knesset officials, and often invited to sit in committee discussions on humanitarian issues (Knesset 2014).

Excerpt #3 Interview with Zamir

> "they [the activists] have a direct line to the Battalion Commander and the General Officer Commanding, people that you don't even dream of talking with ... next thing you know, you receive a direct command from above"

In my conversation with Zamir, (Excerpt #3), he described how he was amazed by the fact that these activists could converse with his commanders on the phone. In the soldiers' perspective,

which place much emphasis on hierarchy and rank, commanders are highly revered and there is a distance, physical and mental, between the simple soldier and the Battalion Commander or the General Officer Commanding. The activists line of communication with these figures is confusing and frightening, since it breaks the ranks and order and invokes the commanders' rage and disapproval.

By utilizing this line of communication, the activists indicate to the soldiers that they are being surveilled and their mistakes and misconduct are reported. The soldiers feel the pressure of sousveillance both through the activists' intervention and via the phone calls from supervisors that demand a solution or require an explanation.

Intended Consequences

Examination of open sources indicates that though not always successful, this sousveillance on the checkpoints' soldiers can lead to a positive change in behavior. The activists' pressure and monitoring force the soldiers to comply with freedom of movement issues, such as opening additional gates, allowing individuals or vehicles to pass through the checkpoint, or manning more inspection stations.

Excerpt #4: MachsomWatch Report: (04.29.2010)

> *6:45 Sheikh Saed: A line of some 30-40 persons winding as far as the edge of the corridor above … A wait of 20-30 minutes for inhabitants of a small village only a fraction of whose residents have the "right" to cross. Meticulous checks are conducted also for small children who are required to present documents (permits from school?) and have their school-bags checked. … Sh. entered to speak to the person checking in. He said: "I check according to orders. We don't mess around. This is how we have to work." But it seems he let people through more quickly thereafter. We called humanitarian headquarters to complain. After a few minutes, we heard the phone in the booth ringing and heard the answer: "I can't work faster, I'm on my own." At the same time, a soldier materialized out of the checkpoint area and started to help with the checking. The harassment of the children stopped, and*

> *most crossed quickly without checks. The line grew shorter even though after 7:00 the stream of children grew.*

Excerpt #4 shows how this pressure lead to an immediate change at the checkpoint in a way that improves the local population's experience. The activists applied pressure on the soldiers twice. First, by engaging them personally over the slow inspection process, and later when informing the humanitarian headquarters on the status at the checkpoint. This pressure drove the soldiers to alter their behavior. The soldiers reorganized and prioritized the checking process over what they did before, allowing the line to move faster.

This is not an isolated incident but rather a systemic pattern of behavior. Activists press the soldiers on particular questions or issues and solve it. A quantitative textual analysis conducted on agency verbs in the 2010 MachsomWatch's daily reports shows that when they intervene the activists enjoy a success rate of 41% (Table 1). It identified the link between the activists' intervention on a particular issue related to movement in the checkpoint and the chances of solving or not solving it.

Yet this pressure yields more than compliance to the surveillants' will; in some cases it also has self-disciplinary results. Talking with the soldiers I received the impression that in some cases there is a panoptic process taking place. As Farrar (2014) suggested, aware of the fact that they are being watched, the soldiers become more self-conscious and consequently increase their compliance with rules of conduct.

Excerpt #5 Interview with Karl

> *When they [the protesters] are around, the soldiers think twice about whether or not to unpack the suspected Palestinian vehicle that is full of merchandise for a routine check since they fear that later they may find themselves on the Internet as abusers—it damages the soldiers' tactical performance. (Karl)*

The camera and the close observation made the soldiers more self-aware and concerned. This is evident as well in clips released to the media wherein soldiers demand not to be included in the clip. In excerpt #5 Karl invokes his fear of the potential repercussions of being surveilled. The soldiers mentioned that they feel sousveillance prevents them from acting naturally or freely. The monitoring even instigates self-doubt, as soldiers' question whether what they do is right or not. The fact that in some instances the protesters belong to the same "in-group," in term of national and ethnic identity, leads some soldiers to wonder what they are doing on the other side of the fence. In one of the accounts, a soldier mentioned that in one of the protests he was sent to deal with he discovered that one of his former platoon members, who had finished his service, stood on the other side, demonstrating. Though he was familiar with his former colleague's politics while serving together it was still bewildering and out of place to see him on the other side of the fence. The soldier mentioned that it drove him to adopt a more nuanced and complex worldview.

However, ultimately the main effect of the activists' monitoring, as described by the soldiers, is compliance with regulations. As Fararr (2014) argued, being surveilled drives individuals to cling to regulations. In the eyes of the soldiers, the activists' status is unclear. They are not local population, they are not immediate threat, they are civilians, and often belong to the "right" "in-group." Adding to that the fact that they are actively observed and their actions documented, the soldiers turn to their regulations for help. Turning to the regulations is a defense strategy. The individual pressed sticks to the rules he knows were approved by his superiors, knowing that he cannot be prosecuted for doing what he was told.

Excerpt #6 Interview with Uri

> *"When they come [the activists], soldiers are trying to pay more attention to what they are doing, in terms of sticking to regulations and not to fall into provocations" (Uri)*

The focus on regulation is a recurring theme from all sources. In the clips released to the media the soldiers rationalize their actions or requests of the activists by evoking regulations. Regulations are also a language that the activists can recognize. In MachsomWatch's reports the activists are frequently measuring the checkpoint's function in light of its regulations. Regulations can explain why activists should not be within the checkpoint, why one person cannot pass and another can, or why the activists are not allowed to use their cameras (Kaniuk 2007; Levine 2008). Excerpt #6 illustrates this approach. Uri described how he and his friends became more self-aware when watched by the activists. According to him, the solution for this situation was to make sure there is in line with regulations.

To summarize, the intended consequences of sousveillance in the case of Israeli soldiers at checkpoints in the West Bank are twofold. First, the soldiers describe a change in behavior. Concerned about being watched and the potential unknown consequences, the soldiers modify the way they inspect the locals at the checkpoints. This change in behavior is corroborated from MachsomWatch's reports, showing how soldiers are pressed to show more leniency in their inspections or to be more accommodating towards the local population. Second, the soldiers internalize the sousveillance, becoming self-aware of their actions. Some soldiers question their deeds while others stick to regulation as a form of defense mechanism. Nonetheless, looking further into the soldiers' accounts we can see that compliance is just one possible response to sousveillance; there is also resistance.

Unintended Consequences

Being watched and pressed by the activists can also incite unintended consequences. All sources corroborate that soldiers' responses can include different levels of use of force to prevent the activists' monitoring. Activists are yelled at and asked to leave, with soldiers telling them that it is

a closed military zone and that civilians are not allowed to enter it. Occasionally, the soldiers decide to elevate their level of aggregation, arresting or detaining and inspecting the activists and their vehicles. In rare occasions, soldiers may even resort to physical violence, arresting or beating the activists (Banai and Shamir 2008; Sharon and Inbari 2007; Walla Editorial Board 2005).

Excerpt #7 MachsomWatch Report: (04.04.2010)

> *"When we already thought we had passed the last checkpoint in the route we had planned, reality slapped us in the face: a soldier from the passage unit regarded us as her enemies. She told the BP officer to take our IDs for inspection and then demanded that we park our car by the side of the road: "You know who they are?- they are watch women!", she yelled at the BP officer and the tone of her voice was full of disgust. She immediately started with a display of power in front of her friends and at our expense. It was no accident that the inspection of our IDs lingered on and on, a fact that made the armed men around us glad."*

As a form of resistance, soldiers can abuse their authority to detain and inspect the activists. Excerpt #7 demonstrate that sort of dynamic. The report shows that though the soldiers identify the activists, knowing that they pose no threat, the soldiers decide to detain and inspect them. In the interviews soldiers mentioned that sometimes because the activists harass them they would act in spite, to show them who is the boss. In other cases, soldiers use regulations to prevent activists from entering the West Bank, not allowing them to pass the checkpoint (ACRI 2014; Hass 2013; Taayush 2014).

In some instances, the unintended consequences can extend beyond the dynamics between soldiers and activists, leading to a real harm to the local population that the activists are attempting to speak and fight for. The soldiers described how the pressure repeatedly harmed the Palestinians. The soldiers argue that the moment they get distracted because they need to deal with the peace activists, their inspection slows and creates longer lines for the Palestinians, making the checkpoint experience harder.

Excerpt #8 Interview with Nir

> *These guys are disturbing the Palestinians as well. Everything is going OK until these guys [peace activists] arrive. There are more arguments, everything turns complex. The presence of these guys brings the Palestinian an element of support, as if there is someone that speaks for them. However, it is counterproductive since it blocks the checkpoint flow, making everything stand still. (Nir)*

In excerpt #8 Nir describes how unintentionally the activists' intervention leads to hurting the Palestinians. The soldiers feel that they need to alter their focus and deal with the activists rather than with the checkpoint management. When diverting their attention, it means the soldiers have less time to keep on with the inspection process and consequently the lines become longer. [4]

Generally, the soldiers view the activists in an unfavorable light. While some see them as a nuisance, others recognize them as a threat or as "type of traitors." Because of that, on many occasions soldiers try to get rid of the activists or deter them. One of the most common, and efficient, forms of resistance the soldiers demonstrate is to use their leverage on the Palestinians to influence the activists.

Excerpt #9 Interview with Dan

> *Their presence hurts the Palestinians… there was this case when a vehicle arrived to the checkpoint when MachsomWatch were there. They [the activists] started asking us questions saying it is wrong and asking us not to examine the family at the car. The soldiers told the activists 'OK, until you guys walk away we won't let anyone get through the checkpoint.' Eventually even the Palestinians asked them to leave. (Dan)*

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[4] Though consistent among soldiers, this was not confirmed by other sources. The activists believe that their presence is meaningful and contributes to the Palestinians. The soldiers on the other hand believe that even though the activists have good intentions they don't see the big picture and they do not understand what is actually going on.

The soldiers threaten the activists that their interference will result in harm to the Palestinians. The checkpoint will be closed and no one would be able to pass. All the people that need to go to work, school, friends or hospitals won't be able to get there. This scenario, described in Excerpt #9, always ends the same way: the activists cave and comply with the soldiers' requests. This form of resistance was confirmed from the interviews, MachsomWatch's reports, and other open sources (Buchbut 2008; Kaniuk 2007; Levine 2008). This resistance counters the activists' goals, since it presents them in a situation in which their sousveillance causes harm to the people they are attempting to help.

To summarize, in the case of monitoring soldiers at checkpoint missions in the West Bank, sousveillance also has unintended consequences. The soldiers may resist the social pressure by pushing back in an attempt to regain control and order. Their resistance is an attempt to discipline the activists, demarcating the boundaries of order and hierarchy at the checkpoint. This manifests as either pressing or mistreatment of activists or alternatively as collective punishment that hurts the Palestinians and forces the activists to cave.

Thus, far the analysis showed that sousveillance works but also invites some unexpected results. These unexpected results are potentially so problematic that they may question the relevancy of sousveillance all together in some cases, after all, if intervening causing more harm than good it maybe not the right policy. Therefore, the principal question these results raise is what triggers the resistance? Understanding that may help us figure out how to keep away from counterproductive sousveillance.

Too much pressure

As mentioned, from the soldiers' perspective, the activists are problematic elements that make the already complex and tedious checkpoint routine more complicated and even more dangerous. The moment they intervene the soldiers feel less in control since there is a rogue element in their domain that breaks ranks and disturbs the "sacred" order. Forced to deal with the activists instead of the crowd, the soldiers feel they are exposed to security threats. Those feelings are exacerbated when the levels of disruption increase.

Excerpt #10 Interview with Nir

> *The checkpoint's flow can be smooth; you just inspect and let people pass to work and occasionally there are those require an exhaustive inspection. But most of the time when these guys arrive the flow stops. It is as if everything switches to an agitative mode. If 5 minutes ago everything is businesslike, in a second everything becomes annoying. Imagine a situation where someone wants to go to work and you discuss it with him and come with a solution both sides can agree on. Now imagine that in the same dynamic you have an activist standing right in your face, in your personal space eye-to-eye, yelling at you "why won't you let him pass? Why do you that? Why won't you do this? Look at what you are doing"… looking back at that situation I genuinely don't know how I tolerated it. (Nir)*

A high level of pressure via sousveillance, such as the one described by Nir, is likely to lead to resistance. The interviews and reports indicate that sousveillance that increases the pressure also increases the likelihood of backlash. The soldiers were mostly upset about direct intervention, meaning that activists get inside the checkpoint, the soldiers' personal space, to intervene as moderators or on behalf of the local population. In a clip release to the media by MachsomWatch, an activist presses the soldiers by taking their pictures, entering their private space, entering places they argue she is not allowed to enter, and generally arguing with them. The film shows that the soldiers become increasingly agitated and eventually they called military police to arrest her (Banai and Shamir 2008).

Excerpt #11 Interview with Avner

> *It is important to mention that if they (the peace activists) were there but did not disturb us… they came with their car and talked with the Palestinians, giving them water bottles or standing far I did not mind it…..but when they shove the camera in your face, argue with you and getting inside the checkpoint it than you don't do your work properly. (Avner)*

In contrast, an indirect intervention, such as talking with superior in the command chain, or simply observing from a safe distance, did not raise the same level of animosity. Avner (Excerpt #11) mentioned that if the activists are merely observing and taking pictures from after he did not mind them. According to him, animosity began when the activists broke the order of the checkpoint, violating personal space, arguing, or entering the checkpoint. An examination of the activists' reports and news media support this assumption. It shows that on many interactions the soldiers insist the activists maintain safe distance from the checkpoint and the soldiers. It seems that for the soldiers, as long the activists are in their controlled location in the checkpoint they can be tolerated. In some checkpoints, there is also a line marked on the ground, signifying the activists where to stand, and the soldiers constantly insisting the activists will not pass it (Banai and Shamir 2008; Levine 2008).

Activists working within the chain of command is something the soldiers may not like but can understand. As mentioned, the activists enjoy a success rate of roughly 41% when intervening in the checkpoint's dynamics, helping the local population with solving immediate problems. However, a close examination of the cases shows that the successful outcome, in the activists' view, occurred mostly when they operated within the checkpoints' regulations. The data shows that 71% of interventions was directed at supervisor rather the soldiers. Addressing supervisors also accounted to over 90% of the cases labeled as successful. The tactic of applying a direct

pressure on the soldiers was responsible for less than 10% of the successful episodes. We can assume from these results that indirect sousveillance would be more effective, since it will reduce the level of animosity of the security forces involved (Table 1).

The pressure comes not only from the activists but also from the local population. The soldiers described how the activists' sousveillance provokes the Palestinians to engage more with the soldiers. The soldiers perceive that the Palestinians act out for the cameras, that they feel "empowered" or "more daring," "becoming argumentative or aggressive." They feel that there is a crowd for their unfair situation and therefore it is an opportunity for them to express their grievances more explicitly.

Excerpt #12 Interview with Richard

> *[When the activists are there] the Palestinians are trying to exploit the decline in our alertness to smuggle things… They exploit the fact that you are busy with the peace organizations to pass without permission or to smuggle things in their belongings. …it gives the Palestinians more options if they don't get what they want, so they can turn to an additional element in order to get a better deal… there is the DCL that is in charge of treating special cases and answering allegations and requests in a very professional manner, and instead the Palestinians turn to the organizations. (Richard)*

Beyond becoming more aggressive and argumentative, the Palestinians reexamine and try to redefine the checkpoint's rules and norms. News and activists' clips illustrate this behavior, showing that when noticing the camera is on some people act out, talking to the camera and potential audience (Efroni 2013; Kerman 2004; Shuv and Amir 2009). In the eyes of the soldiers the fact that they are preoccupied with the activists allows the Palestinians to challenge their authority. Likewise, in his account, Richard (Excerpt #12) describes how the activists' intervention gives the Palestinians an informal option to promote their requests, and in the process inviting

more of the type of intervention the soldiers dislike. Pressed by the activists and later by the local population, the soldiers feel they are losing control of the situation and respond accordingly.

To summarize, the checkpoints' sousveillance spurs resistance by the soldiers when the levels of pressure applied are too disruptive and intrusive in the soldiers' perspective. The pressure can come from the activists or the local population, but in either way it cultivates the soldiers' feelings of losing control. In response, the soldiers resist, applying pressure on the activists and the local population.

Conclusion

As an empowering civic engagement act, sousveillance had been gaining popularity among activists and the media's embrace. It represents the peoples' voice and demand for accountability and transparency from authorities. Yet, despite its increasing popularity and democratic importance, our understanding of sousveillance and its implications are still lacking. In this paper, I address some core issues related to the outcome of sousveillance, examining how sousveillance influences soldiers' policing in checkpoint missions. By triangulating data from interviews with the soldiers, reports from activists, and open sources I first confirm that sousveillance is taking place in the setting examined. Later, I explore what the intended consequences of sousveillance are —namely, whether it induces compliance and whether it is panoptic. Next, I examine the unintended consequences of sousveillance, looking at cases where soldiers resist and their response causes harm to the activists or the people they are trying to help. Lastly, I clarify under what conditions sousveillance succeed, ending in the intended consequences, and when it fails, leading to resistance and unintended consequences. The results suggest three general themes for discussion.

First, this study shows that like surveillance, sousveillance can induce compliance. The research shows that soldiers monitored by activists alter their behavior in line with the activists' agenda. Furthermore, sousveillance's effect goes beyond a change in behavior, as it also has a panoptic element. When watched, soldiers become self-aware, reexamining their actions. As the soldiers indicate, the panoptic gaze drives them to stick to regulations as a form of defense mechanism.

Second, the study highlights a fundamental structural element in the sousveillance dynamic, the hierarchy of power between the surveillant and the subject. Inversion of the surveillance where the direction of observation is from the powerful to the weak, from the government to the individuals, sousveillance faces a substantial problem. Unlike the subject of surveillance that is mostly helpless, the subject of sousveillance possesses a significant power within the setting it is observed in. Consequently, it can resist more effectively. In the case examined, this hierarchy manifested in harming activists or the local population.

Thirdly, this study offers a possible answer for the question when sousveillance fails and when it succeeds. The analysis indicates that too much pressure by the activists can push the subjects to resist. Given that their resistance is asymmetrical, meaning they have more power in the setting than the activists, it can lead to failure, causing harm to the activists or the agenda they are trying to defend. The trigger for resistance is the subjects' feeling of losing control of the situation. Providing the activists are contained or working within the system it is easier for the subjects to accept the sousveillance and comply. The moment the pressure is getting to high, in this case study described as invading private space, intensive argument, or activists entering places they are not allowed, the soldiers feel they lose control of the situation and react.

This research addressed sousveillance's outcome. Nonetheless, the setting and type of sousveillance used represent a limited sample and requires further investigation and development of the term. In contrast to most examples for sousveillance, this case presents sousveillance that mostly takes place in the physical and not the technological sphere. It examines soldiers as a case for security forces. And finally, in a complicated interaction that includes soldiers, activists, supervisors, and the local population it accounts for only two. These limitations invite further research that should test the theory presented and examine it generalizability.

Sousveillance is more than an academic term. It is a description of the civic engagement we regularly witness as it performed by individuals and social movements. It became an important part of the dialogue between citizens and governments. Therefore, it is critical for us to better understand sousveillance. This study highlights theoretical and policy related aspects of sousveillance. Its most significant contribution is in clarifying when sousveillance is working, when it fails, and why. As a form of social control sousveillance applies social pressure on the object observed. The findings underscore the consequences of this pressure and the importance of controlling it. Understanding what triggers resistance is important for theoretical reasons, as it fills the gap in our understanding of how sousveillance operates. It is also important for policy reasons for law enforcement personnel and activists alike, as knowing where the line is makes it easier for parties involved to avoid violence and loss of control. My study also clarifies the part of the hierarchical structure, and consequent power, in sousveillance and surveillance. Acknowledging the hierarchical dimension in the relations between the surveillant and subject shows that there is more than one power operating in the situation and that some of it can go in different directions. Lastly, this study's findings have an important implication for practitioners and activists. Given that sousveillance is panoptic and drives the subjects to stick to regulations, lobbying or promoting

different regulations as complementary approaches to sousveillance can lead to a change in behavior.

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